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Allowing Perpetuities in North Carolina
JOHN V. ORTH*

As one state after another acts to make perpetual trusts possible, a
little-noticed provision in some state constitutions forbidding "perpetuities" is receiving new attention. The first such provision-originally
in North Carolina's 1776 Constitution and later copied by other
states-is now the subject of litigation that will determine the constitutionality of the state's recent repeal of the Rule Against Perpetuities as
applied to beneficial interests in trust. The case, Brown Brothers Harriman Trust Co. v. Benson,' seems set to become a landmark that could
be influential as other states with similar constitutional provisions
respond to the demand for allowing perpetual trusts.
Perpetuitiesand monopolies are contrary to the
genius of a free state and shall not be allowed.
N.C. CONST. art. I, § 34.
On August 19, 2007, House Bill 1384 became law in North Carolina. It repealed the Rule Against Perpetuities as applied to trusts if
the trustee has a power of sale.3 It is, therefore, now possible in this
state to create perpetual trusts. Popularly known as "dynasty trusts,"
such trusts can preserve property for the benefit of a settlor's descendants from generation to generation forever, that is, in perpetuity.
2

* William Rand Kenan, Jr. Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School
of Law. A.B. 1969, Oberlin College; J.D. 1974, M.A. 1975, Ph.D. 1977, Harvard

University.
1. No. 08-CVS-13456 (N.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2009), appeal filed, Notice of
Appeal, No. 08-CVS-13456 (N.C. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 2009).

2. An Act to Repeal the Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities as it Applies to Trusts
Created or Administered in this State and Codify the Law Regarding the Power of

Alienation for Trusts Created in North Carolina, ch. 41, 2007 N.C. Sess. Laws 390
(codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 41-15, -23).
3. Id. at sec. 1, § 41-23(e).
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By adopting this statute, North Carolina joined a nationwide
movement away from the centuries-old policy of limiting the duration
of trusts. Although the dynastic impulse is as old as the human race,
settlors today create such trusts mainly to shelter assets from federal
taxes on succession at death.4 Since 1986, when the United States
Congress amended the tax code to provide for a tax on assets in excess
of an exempt amount transferred at death at each generation, either in
the form of the traditional estate tax or a new "generation-skipping
transfer tax,"5 the District of Columbia and twenty-three states have
adopted legislation permitting perpetual or nearly perpetual trusts. 6 If
care is taken in settling the trust, no estate or generation-skipping
transfer tax on the exempt amount or its accumulations will be due
until the trust terminates and the money is finally distributed. In
effect, the perpetual trust allows individuals to fund a trust for the use
and enjoyment of their descendants forever. Those lobbying for the
new legislation have been lawyers and bankers seeking the business of
establishing and servicing dynasty trusts.7

4. See Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, The Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 50
UCLA L. REV. 1303, 1312-16 (2003).
5. 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601-2664 (2002 & Supp. 2008). In 2009, the exemption is
$3.5 million per transferor. Id. § 2631(c).
6. Since the 1986 tax code amendment, the District of Columbia and sixteen
states have enacted statutes permitting perpetual trusts: ALASKA STAT. §§ 34.27.051, .100 (2008); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2901(A)(3) (2005 & Supp. 2009); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 25, § 503 (1989 & Supp. 2008); D.C. CODE ANN. § 19-904(a)(10) (LexisNexis
2008); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 305/3(a-5),/4(a)(8) (2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33,
§ 101-A (Supp. 2008); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 11-102(b)(5) (LexisNexis
Supp. 2008); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 554.91-.94 (Supp. 2009); Mo. REV. STAT. § 456.025
(2000); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-2005(9) (2003); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564:24 (2006 &
Supp. 2008); NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:2F-9 to -11 (West 2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-23
(Supp. 2008); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2131.09(B) (LexisNexis 2007); 20 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 6107.1(b)(1) (West Supp. 2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-11-38 (Supp. 2008); VA.
CODE ANN. § 55-13.3(C) (2007). The following seven states acted to permit very long
trusts in the aftermath of the 1986 tax code amendment: COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-111102.5 (2008) (1000 years); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 689.225 (West 1994 & Supp. 2009)
(360 years); NEV. REV. STAT. § 111.1031(1)(b) (2007) (365 years); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 66-1-202(f) (Supp. 2008) (360 years); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1203 (Supp. 2008)
(1000 years); WASH. REV. CODE § 11.98.130 (West 2006) (150 years); Wyo. STAT. ANN.
§ 34-1-139 (2005) (1000 years). In 1986, three states already permitted perpetual
trusts: IDAHO CODE ANN. § 55.-111 (2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 43-5-1, -8 (2004);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 700.16(3) (West 2001).
7. Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 4, at 1315-16. On the general topic of
jurisdictional arbitrage, see John V. Orth, "The Race to the Bottom": Competition in the
Law of Property, 9 GREEN BAG 2D 47 (2005).
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The race to allow perpetual trusts has brought new attention to
little-known provisions in a number of state constitutions. Ten states
have constitutional provisions prohibiting "perpetuities."8 North Carolina's ban, adopted in 1776, was the first, and is representative of the
others: "Perpetuities and monopolies are contrary to the genius of a
free state and shall not be allowed." 9 Every North Carolina Constitution since 1776 has included this section in its Declaration of Rights.'O
North Carolina's first state constitution consisted of two documents: the Declaration of Rights, adopted on December 17, 1776, and
the constitution, adopted the following day and incorporating the Declaration of Rights by reference. 1 The Constitution of North Carolina
(specifically so-called) also contained a provision against perpetuities
which stated, "[T]he future legislature of this state shall regulate
entails in such a manner as to prevent perpetuities."' 2 Entails are
8. ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 29; ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 19; MONT. CONST. art. 13, § 6;
NEV. CONST. art. 15, § 4; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 34; OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 32; TENN.
CONST. art. 1, § 22; TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 26; VT.CONST. ch. II, § 63; Wyo. CONST. art.
1, § 30.
9. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 34. "Genius" is relevantly defined as a "peculiar,
distinctive, or identifying character" and "an attendant spirit of a person or place."
MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 486 (10th ed. 1993). Monopolies still had
political overtones at the time of the American Revolution. English monarchs had
used grants of monopolies to reward their political favorites, provoking parliament to
adopt the Statute of Monopolies, 21 Jac. I, c. 3 (1624), which made all monopolies
illegal except those authorized by parliament or those granted to protect inventions.
JOHN
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(1993).
10. N.C. CONST. of 1776, Decl. of Rts., § 23, available at http://avalon.law.yale.
edu/18th century/ncO7.asp; N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 31; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 34.
The 1776 Declaration of Rights provided that, "Perpetuities and monopolies are
contrary to the genius of a free state, and ought not to be allowed." That wording was
carried forward in the 1868 Constitution. In 1971 "shall not be allowed" was
substituted for "ought not to be allowed," a change presented by the drafters as merely
editorial. N.C. STATE CONSTITUTION STUDY COMM'N, REPORT OF THE N.C. STATE
CONSTITUTION STUDY COMMISSION TO THE N.C. STATE BAR AND THE N.C. BAR ASSOCIATION
4, 65 (1968). All other current state constitutions banning perpetuities, see sources
cited supra note 8, also use the construction "shall not be allowed."
11. N.C. CONST. of 1776, § 44, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_
century/nc07.asp. North Carolina's first constitution was adopted by a "provincial
congress," not by popular vote. 10 THE COLONIAL RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 913,
973-74 (William L. Saunders ed., 1890), available at http://docsouth.unc.edu/csr/
index.html/document/csr10-0442. Since the adoption of the state's second
constitution in 1868, the Declaration of Rights has appeared as Article I. ORTH, supra
note 9, at 37. For a survey of North Carolina's constitutional history, see id. at 1-34.
12. N.C. CONST. of 1776, § 43, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_
century/nc07.asp. The Vermont Constitution to this day includes an almost identical
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estates created by grants in fee tail, by which land is limited to pass
only to descendants from generation to generation forever, in
13
perpetuity.
In 1784, the North Carolina General Assembly, as part of a sweeping reform of property law,1 4 obeyed the constitutional directive concerning entails, and legislated that anyone seized of an estate in fee tail
shall be deemed to be seized of the same in fee simple.' 5 A prologue to
the legislation explained its purpose in political terms, reminiscent of
the phrase in the Declaration of Rights that perpetuities and monopolies are "contrary to the genius of a free state.' 1 6 The prologue stated
that "entails of estates tend only to raise the wealth and importance of
particular families and individuals, giving them an unequal and undue
influence in a republic, and prove in manifold instances the source of
great contention and injustice. ' '17 The adoption of the statute eliminating the fee tail as a possessory estate obviated the need for a constitutional provision directing such legislation, and the section disappeared
from subsequent North Carolina constitutions. But the general ban on
provision. VT. CONST. ch. II, § 63 ("The Legislature shall regulate entails in such
manner as to prevent perpetuities."). Three state constitutions ban perpetuities and
entails in the same section. ARIz. CONST. art. II, § 29 ("No hereditary emoluments,
privileges, or powers shall be granted or conferred, and no law shall be enacted
permitting any perpetuity or entailment in this State."); OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 32
("Perpetuities and monopolies are contrary to the genius of a free government and
shall never be allowed, nor shall the law of primogeniture or entailments ever be in
force in this State."); TEX. CoNsr. art. 1, § 26 ("Perpetuities and monopolies are
contrary to the genius of a free government, and shall never be allowed, nor shall the
law of primogeniture or entailments ever be in force in this State.").
13. Created by a grant in the form "0 to A and the heirs of his body," the fee tail
limited inheritance to the grantee's descendants, rather than to his heirs in general. It
formed the legal basis of the landed aristocracy. For a brief history of the fee tail, see
John V. Orth, Does the Fee Tail Exist in North Carolina?, 23 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 767,
773-78 (1988).
14. At the same time, the General Assembly eliminated the right of survivorship
associated with the concurrent estate of joint tenancy. Act of 1784, ch. 22, § VI,
reprinted in 24 THE STATE RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 574 (Walter Clark ed., 1904)
(now codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2 (2007)). Not until 1990 did the right of
survivorship return as an incident of a statutory joint tenancy. See John V. Orth, The
Joint Tenancy Makes a Comeback in North Carolina, 69 N.C. L. REV. 491 (1991).
15. Act of 1784, ch. 22, § V (now codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-1 (2007)). For a
history of the statute through various revisions and consolidations, see Orth, supra
note 13, at 778-82. For the context of the American abolition of primogeniture and
entailments, see John V. Orth, After the Revolution: "Reform" of the Law of Inheritance,
10 LAW & HIST. REv. 33 (1992).
16. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 34; Act of 1784, ch. 22, § V.
17. Act of 1784, ch. 22, § V.
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perpetuities in the Declaration of Rights remained and has been carried forward to the present day.
What Is a Perpetuity?
Nowhere constitutionally defined, the word "perpetuity" had three
distinct but related meanings at common law.' 8 The first, as we have
seen, was the entailed estate. In its original form, the fee tail was
"unbarrable"; that is, it could not be converted into a fee simple and
sold or directed away from the grantee's descendants. Barring the
entail became possible in England by legal fiction, notably through a
device called common recovery, traditionally dated to Taltarum's Case
in 1472.1' However, by a quirk of history the device did not cross the
Atlantic with the English settlers. Unbarrable entails were still possible in North Carolina at Independence, which is why the first Constitution of North Carolina directed their elimination.
In addition to an unbarrable entail, "perpetuity" had two other
meanings: an inalienable interest and a future interest that could
remain unvested for too long. 20 These were dealt with, respectively, by
the Rule Against Restraints on Alienation and the Rule Against
Perpetuities.
The Rule Against Restraints on Alienation
Alienation is the power to convey title. At common law, all vested
property interests, present and future, are presumed to be alienable.
Although limited exceptions are allowed under special circumstances
and for a reasonable time, disabling restraints are not favored. 2 ' A significant inroad into the Rule Against Restraints on Alienation was
18. See Charles Sweet, Some Recent Decisions on the Rule Against Perpetuities, 27
L.Q. REV. 150, 170 (1911) ("That unfortunate word has three distinct meanings .. "),
cited in 7 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 194 n.2 (2d ed. 1937)

(mistaking the volume number in which the Sweet article appeared).
19. Y.B. 12 Edw. IV (1472), discussed in 3
117-20 (5th ed. 1942).

WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH,

A HISTORY

OF

ENGLISH LAW

20. Unvested future interests were inalienable at common law, so the two types of
perpetuity were related. Future interests that would remain unvested for too long
continued to be regarded as perpetuities even after they became generally alienable.
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-6.3(a) (2007) (making all future interests alienable, devisable,
and inheritable).
21. See LEWIS M. SIMES, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 113 (2d ed.
1966) ("With the exception of restraints on alienation incident to beneficial interests
in spendthrift trusts, all disabling restraints are void."). The classic text on restraints
against alienation is JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY

(2d ed. 1895), expressing the author's vehement opposition to spendthrift trusts.
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made by the recognition in a growing number of states beginning in
the late nineteenth century of the so-called "spendthrift trust," a trust
with a provision forbidding the beneficiaries from alienating their
equitable interests either voluntarily or involuntarily.2 2 The effect is to
insulate the interests in trust from the claims of the beneficiaries' creditors; in other words, to protect the assets for successive beneficiaries
23
from the improvidence of a spendthrift.
North Carolina courts have traditionally applied the common law
Rule Against Restraints on Alienation,2 4 and the North Carolina General Assembly was among the last to legislate in favor of spendthrift
trusts.15 Even the 2007 legislation permitting perpetual trusts voids

trusts that suspend the trustee's power of alienation for too longlonger than the period measured by a life in being at the creation of
22. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-1-103(18) (2007).
23. A spendthrift is defined as "1: one that spends or uses improvidently or
wastefully," and "2: one who spends his estate (as by drinking or gambling) so as to
expose himself or his family to want or suffering or to becoming a charge upon the
public." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2190 (1971). The word was
at first avoided in trust drafting because of its pejorative connotations, but is now
commonly accepted as a term of art. Nonetheless, one should be aware that the term
was originated by critics of the device. Cf. W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities:The Nutshell
Revisited, 78 HARV. L. REv. 973, 991 n.78 (1965) ("Items of jargon can also be usefully
argumentative, . . . designed as they are to point out the absurdity of the designated
doctrines."). Argumentative jargon will appear again in the discussion of the Rule
Against Perpetuities.
24. 2 PATRICK A. HETRICK & JAMES P. McLAUGHLIN, JR., WEBSTER'S REAL ESTATE LAW
IN NORTH CAROLINA § 18-9 (5th ed. 1999) ("North Carolina has a long history of
caselaw striking down restraints on alienation.").
25. In 1995 Professor Hirsch listed New Hampshire and North Carolina as the
only two states that "deny effectiveness to spendthrift trusts." Adam J. Hirsch,
Spendthrift Trusts and Public Policy: Economic and Cognitive Perspectives, 73 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1, 3 n.8 (1995). New Hampshire subsequently authorized such trusts. N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 564:23 (1997). Until the adoption of the Uniform Trust Code in 2006,
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-1-101ff (2007), North Carolina legislation still referred only to
a near relative of spendthrift trusts, "protective trusts." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A115(b)(3) (1999) (now codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-5-508). Prior to North
Carolina's adoption of the Uniform Trust Code, protective trust was defined as:
A trust wherein the creating instrument provides that the interest of the
beneficiary shall cease if
a. The beneficiary alienates or attempts to alienate that interest; or
b. Any creditor attempts to reach the beneficiary's interest by attachment,
levy, or otherwise, or
c. The beneficiary becomes insolvent or bankrupt.
Id. Like a spendthrift trust, a protective trust secured the trust assets from the
beneficiary's creditors, but it did so at the expense of forfeiting the beneficiary's
interest.
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the trust plus twenty-one years 26 -a period familiar from the common
law Rule Against Perpetuities. While the legal interests must be alienable (or become so within the perpetuities period), the beneficial interests may remain inalienable forever.2 7 In other words, successive
trustees have the power to invest and re-invest the trust property for the
benefit of unborn generations in perpetuity, but the beneficiaries have
no power to alienate their beneficial interests either voluntarily or
involuntarily. This shelters the beneficiaries forever from the claims of
creditors.
Because charitable trusts (trusts for charitable purposes with no
definite beneficiaries) involve the recognition of inalienable beneficial
interests, they are technically perpetuities. Two state constitutions
expressly recognize this fact: the Montana constitution ("No perpetuities shall be allowed except for charitable purposes") 8 and the
Nevada constitution ("No perpetuities shall be allowed except for eleemosynary purposes"). 2 9 Although the North Carolina constitution's
ban on perpetuities lacks a comparable exception, charitable trusts
have always been recognized in this state despite the Rule Against
Restraints on Alienation.30 The exception is necessary if charitable
trusts are to exist at all. The beneficial interests in charitable trusts
must be inalienable, as Professor John Chipman Gray explained,
"because there is no one to alienate them. No one has any alienable
rights, because no one has any rights.

31

The Rule Against Perpetuities
The common law Rule Against Perpetuities, memorized by generations of law students, was stated in capital form by Professor Gray:
"NO INTEREST IS GOOD UNLESS IT MUST VEST, IF AT ALL, NOT
LATER THAN TWENTY-ONE YEARS AFTER SOME LIFE IN BEING
26. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-23(a) (2007). Regardless of the trustee's power of sale,
alienation is not considered suspended under the statute if "there exists an unlimited
power to terminate the trust in one or more persons in being." Id. at § 41-23(e).
27. Id. § 41-23(e), (h).
28. MONT. CONST. art. 13, § 6.
29. NEV. CONST. art. 15, § 4. A proposal to repeal this section of the Nevada
constitution was rejected by the voters in 2002. See Election 2002, RENO GAZETTE-J.,
Nov. 8, 2002, at 3C (reporting results). A similar provision in the California
constitution was repealed in 1970. CAL. CONST. art. 20, § 9 (repealed).
30. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-4-405(c)(4) (declaring a charitable gift not invalid
although it "contravenes any statute or rule against perpetuities").
31.

JOHN CHIPMAN

ed. 1942).

GRAY, THE

RULE AGAINST PERPETUITlES

567 (Roland Gray ed., 4th

406

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:399

AT THE CREATION OF THE INTEREST."' 32 In this form, the Rule
Against Perpetuities was the law in North Carolina until 2007. 3 3 As is
apparent, the Rule is not directed at vested interests, present or future.
A vested interest in fee simple may last forever, passing by alienation,
devise, or inheritance from one mortal human being to another until
the end of time. Indeed, that is the defining characteristic of a fee: an
interest that can last forever, in perpetuity. 34 Likewise, future interests
retained by a grantor-possibilities of reverter and rights of re-entry
(also known as powers of termination) -are interests that can last forever, because they are vested interests.3 5
Actually a rule against remoteness of vesting, the Rule Against Perpetuities voids future interests that are not certain to vest within the
"perpetuities period. '36 An interest voided by the Rule Against Perpetuities-one that might vest outside the permitted period-was in that
sense a "perpetuity. '37 At the risk of circularity, it could be said that
32. Id. at 191. The Rule Against Perpetuities began to take shape in the
seventeenth century and reached its final form only in the nineteenth century. For a
discussion of the Rule's early development, see George L. Haskins, "Inconvenience" and
the Rule for Perpetuities, 48 Mo. L. REV. 451 (1983). For Professor Gray's role in the
Rule's later development, see Stephen A. Siegel, John Chipman Gray, Legal Formalism,
and the Transformation of Perpetuities Law, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 439 (1982).
33. See, e.g., McPherson v. First & Citizens Nat. Bank of Elizabeth City, 81 S.E.2d
386 (N.C. 1954) (citing Gray); Mercer v. Mercer, 52 S.E.2d 229 (N.C. 1949) (citing
N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 31, the predecessor of current N.C. CONST. art. I, § 34,
banning perpetuities); see also N.C. Nat. Bank v. Norris, 203 S.E.2d 657, 658 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1974) ("The common law rule against perpetuities has been long recognized and
enforced in this jurisdiction, and its application has the continuing sanction of Article
I, Section 34 of our State Constitution."). The Author commented in a reference guide
to the North Carolina constitution that the dictum in Norris "should not be taken to
mean that the Rule Against Perpetuities in its present formulation is beyond the reach
of the legislature." ORTH, supra note 9, at 76. Until 1995, North Carolina courts
applied the common law Rule Against Perpetuities; from 1995 until 2007, legislation
allowed, as an alternative to the common law perpetuities period, a ninety year waitand-see period. Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 41-15
to -22 (2007). See infra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
34. See, e.g., 4 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 4 (Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr. ed., 12th ed. 1873) ("No estate is deemed a fee, unless it may continue
forever.").
35. See 6 THOMAS E. ATKINSON ET AL., AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 12-13 (A. James
Casner ed., 1952) ("Possibilities of reverter and rights of entry for condition broken
are 'vested' from the onset .... "). Statutes now curtail the duration of these interests.
See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-32 (voiding possibilities of reverter and rights of entry
affecting the use of land created after 1995 that fail to become possessory within sixty
years).
36. ATKINSON ET AL., supra note 35, at 13.
37. Id.
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one of the common law meanings of the word "perpetuity" was any
interest that is void for remoteness under the Rule Against
Perpetuities.3"
Although relatively simple of application in ordinary cases-limiting the duration of unvested interests to the lifetimes of persons
known to the grantor and their descendants in the next generation
until what was then the age of majority-the Rule became complicated
by the efforts of conveyancers to stretch the period to the uttermost; for
example, by the extravagant "royal lives clause" in England 3 9 or the
"nine healthy babies clause" in America. 40 Legal academics invented
labels for the logical traps laid by the Rule, at first perhaps in an effort
to make the subject understandable and interesting, but later as a
means of pointing out its absurdities in extreme cases.4 1
One of the Rule's greatest strengths, the certainty provided by
voiding remote interests ab initio, was also one of its weaknesses.
Because any possibility of remote vesting was fatal, bizarre and
unlikely eventualities caused the failure of benign interests. The common law's conclusive presumption of fertility until death, regardless of
age or sex-a source of certainty in applying the Rule-was ridiculed
as the Fertile Octogenarian Rule.42 Also, the unlikely possibility that a
38. Id.; Sweet, supra note 18, at 170 (listing one of the meanings of the word
"perpetuity" as "an interest which is void for remoteness under the modern Rule
against Perpetuities").
39. See In re Villar, [1929] 1 Ch. 243 (C.A.) (upholding a gift to descendants who
shall be living twenty-one years after the death of all lineal descendants of Queen
Victoria now living). The loophole in the Rule allowing clauses using "extraneous
lives" was the phrase "some life in being at the creation of the interest," not limiting the
measuring life to a beneficiary or someone related to a beneficiary. Id. at n.1.
40. See W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 HARV. L. REV. 638, 642
(1938) ("Bequest 'to such of my children and more remote issue as shall be living 21
years after the death of the survivor of R, S, T, U, V, W, X, Y, and Z' (these being nine
healthy babies selected at random).").
41. The shift is indicative of the changing role of the law professor, from
transmitter of tradition to legal reformer. See Leach, supra note 23, at 991 n.78 ("Items
of jargon can also be usefully argumentative .... designed as they are to point out the
absurdity of the designated doctrines."). Interestingly, the "spendthrift" label did not
cause that device to be repudiated; instead, it became a term of art, while the chamber
of horrors associated with the Rule Against Perpetuities brought it into disrepute and
hastened its decline. See supra note 23. Perhaps the explanation can be found in the
self-interest of settlors: spendthrifts endanger the dynastic assets, while the Rule
Against Perpetuities shortens the settlors' reach into the future.
42. Leach, supra note 23, at 992. The common law presumption of fertility is best
exemplified by the decision inJee v. Audley, (1787) 29 Eng. Rep. 1186 (Ch.), actually
involving a septuagenarian. See A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, LEADING CASES IN THE COMMON
LAW 76-99 (1995), for the details of the case. Covering the other end of the age
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beneficiary might marry a woman not alive at the creation of the interest, which leads to the likely possibility that the woman will outlive the
beneficiary, was caricatured as the Unborn Widow Rule.4 3
If the problem with the Rule Against Perpetuities was its prospective application ("at the creation of the interest"), the solution was to
allow retrospective application. Thus, the Rule was occasionally
restated as: NO INTEREST IS GOOD UNLESS IT VESTS [not "must
vest, if at all"] NOT LATER THAN TWENTY-ONE YEARS AFTER
SOME LIFE IN BEING AT THE CREATION OF THE INTEREST. In
other words, one must await the expiration of the perpetuities period
and see if the interest actually vests by that time. A few states, beginning with Pennsylvania in 1947, 4 4 adopted this change, which was subsequently endorsed by the Restatement (Second) of Property. 4 5 North
Carolina did not adopt this version.4 6
Next, problems were raised about ascertaining the "life in being"
relevant to the application of the Rule. To this problem the solution
was to adopt, as an alternative to the common law Rule, a rule that the
interest must vest within a certain period of time, arbitrarily set at 90
years.47 This alternative, in other words, was to restate the Rule: NO
continuum was the Precocious Toddler Rule. See Re Gaite's Will Trusts, [1949] 1 All
Eng. Rep. 459 (Ch.). The common law presumption of fertility must be understood in
the context of a policy that sought rapid and conclusive decisions concerning the
validity of interests without extended fact-finding, as well as the limited medical
knowledge in those pre-modern societies.
43. The problem in this case was not with the gift to the "unborn widow," but with
interests that remained contingent until her death. See Gray, supra note 31, at 208
(describing it as "a mistake which has been often made"); Leach, supra note 23, at 992
(indicating the label). Other instances of argumentative jargon include: The Slothful
Executor, The Magic Gravel Pit, The War that Never Ends, and The Birthday Present
that Blows Up. See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 681-86 (7th
ed. 2005).
44. See 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6104(b) (West 2005); see also W. Barton Leach,
Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror, 65 HARv. L. REv. 721, 730
(1952) (approving of the Pennsylvania legislation).
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 1.4 (1983).
46. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 41-15 to -23 (2007).
47. Ninety years was an estimate of "the average period of time that would
traditionally be allowed by the wait-and-see doctrine." Lawrence W. Waggoner, The
Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities: The Rationale of the 90-Year Waiting Period,
73 CORNELL L. REV. 157, 162 (1988) (reporting rationale of drafters of the Uniform
Statutory Rule). The English Law Commission estimated that a skilled conveyancer,
using a royal lives clause, see sources cited supra note 40 and accompanying text,
could stretch out the period as long as 125 years. THE ENGLISH LAW COMM'N, THE
RULES AGAINST PERPETUITIES AND EXCEssiVE ACCUMULATIONS § 8.13 (1998), available at

http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/docs/lc251.pdf.
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INTEREST IS GOOD UNLESS IT VESTS NOT LATER THAN NINETY
YEARS AFTER [not "twenty-one years after some life in being at"] THE
CREATION OF THE INTEREST. This alternative, incorporated in the
Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities, was proposed by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in
1986 and was adopted by North Carolina in 1995.48 However, as we
have seen, it was repealed in 2007 as applied to trusts if the trustee has
a power of sale.4 9
Allowing perpetual trusts is defended on the grounds that such
trusts do not remove property from the market, assuming the rule
against the suspension of the power of alienation of the legal interests
remains intact. 50 The trustee remains free to alienate the trust property in response to "market demands," that is, to sell to the highest
bidder. But perpetual trusts with spendthrift provisions do make the
equitable interests inalienable in perpetuity, creating generations of
beneficiaries profiting from the trust while protected from the claims
of their creditors. As Professor Lewis M. Simes explained, one of the
purposes of the Rule is "prevent[ing] undue concentration of
wealth."'"
As we have seen, competition for the business of wealthy settlors
has made the perpetual trust available in many states. Failure to allow
perpetuities in North Carolina would likely cause some settlors to
locate their trusts elsewhere. 5 2 But even with the recent legislation,
48. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 41-15 to -22 (allowing a ninety year wait-and-see period as
an alternative to the common law perpetuities period). See Ronald C. Link &
Kimberly A. Licata, Perpetuities Reform in North Carolina: The Uniform Statutory Rule
Against Perpetuities, Nondonative Transfers, and Honorary Trusts, 74 N.C. L. REv. 1783
(1996).
49. An Act to Repeal the Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities as it Applies to Trusts
Created or Administered in this State and Codify the Law Regarding the Power of
Alienation for Trusts Created in North Carolina, ch. 41, 2007 N.C. Sess. Laws 390
(codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 41-15, -23).
50. The economic purposes of the Rule Against Perpetuities, whether in its
common law or Uniform Statutory form, have been described as: "(1) to keep property
marketable and available for productive development in accordance with market
demands, and (2) to limit 'dead hand' control over the property, which prevents the
current owners from using the property to respond to present needs." DUKEMINIER ET
AL., supra note 43, at 674-75. See also id. at 723 ("The policy underlying [the Rule
Against Perpetuities] is that all contingent interests, assignable and nonassignable,
impair marketability.").
51. LEwis M. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 56 (1955).
52. See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 4, at 1342 ("Given the federal tax
advantage of perpetual trusts free of death taxes, the Rule against Perpetuities has the
effect of penalizing beneficiaries of trusts located in states that do not permit
perpetual trusts."). The Wall Street Journal reported that as of the end of 2003, assets
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North Carolina is already behind in the race for trust business. Settlors seek not only unlimited duration for their trusts, but other advantages as well. For example, settlors have begun to seek protection for
the trust assets not only from the beneficiaries' creditors, but also from
their own creditors; in other words, settlors seek to create self-settled
spendthrift trusts, politely known as "asset protection trusts. '5 3 At last
count, eleven states now permit asset protection trusts, though North
Carolina does not.5 4 Unless North Carolina permits everything that is

allowed by the least restrictive state, it will remain less attractive to
wealthy settlors seeking to create perpetual trusts.
Although today perpetuities and monopolies might be considered
"contrary to the genius of a free market," to the drafters of the first
North Carolina Declaration of Rights they posed a political threat.
Like entailed estates, perpetuities "tend only to raise the wealth and
importance of particular families and individuals, giving them an unequal and undue influence in a republic, and prove in manifold
instances the source of great contention and injustice.15 5 For the first
time since 1784, when the General Assembly prohibited unbarrable
entails, perpetuities are now allowed in North Carolina. While in
every state it is a question of public policy whether to permit perpetual
worth $100 billion were placed in institutional trusts in states permitting perpetual
trusts. Rachel Emma Silverman, Looser Trust Laws Lure $100 Billion, WALL ST. J., Feb.
16, 2005, at DI.
53. See, e.g., Stewart E. Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts: Trust Law's Race to the
Bottom?, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1035, 1037-38 (2000). In this case, the "argumentative
jargon" works to conceal rather than to point out the reality. Perhaps settlors prefer
not to be known as "spendthrifts."
54. ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110 (2008); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-10-111 (2008); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 3536(c), 3570-3576 (2007 & Supp. 2008); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 456.5-505 (West 2007); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 166.010-.170 (2008); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 31, §§ 10-18 (2008) (limiting settlors to a single asset protection trust with an
initial funding of no more than $1 million); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 18-9.2-1 to -7 (2008);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 55-1-36, -3-47, -16-1 to -16-17 (2008); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 3516-101 to -112 (2007 & Supp. 2008); UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-6-14 (2008); Wyo. STAT.
ANN. §§ 4-10-103, -506(b), -510 to -523 (2008). Of these states only Oklahoma has so
far resisted allowing perpetual trusts. See sources cited supra note 6. Previously,
spendthrift provisions were limited to trusts for the benefit of persons other than the
settlor. See GEORGE T. BOGERT, TRUSTS § 40 (6th ed. 1987) ("[A] property owner may
not create a spendthrift trust in his own favor."). The self-settled spendthrift trust has
not yet been subjected to significant judicial scrutiny.
55. Act of 1784, ch. 22, § V (now codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-1 (2007))
(barring entails by converting fee tail in possession into fee simple).
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("dynasty") trusts, in North Carolina it is a constitutional question.5 6
Unless "perpetuity" is defined in such a way that a perpetual trust is
not included in the definition, the statute allowing such trusts is
unconstitutional. The North Carolina courts will soon provide an
answer to this constitutional question in Brown Brothers Harriman
Trust Co. v. Benson.5 7 Perpetuities may be congenial to dynasts and the
bankers and lawyers who serve them, but those who drafted and ratified every North Carolina constitution considered them "contrary to
the genius of a free state."

56. Brown Bros. Harriman Trust Co. v. Benson, No. 08-CVS-13456 (N.C. Super. Ct.
Feb. 26, 2009), appealfiled, Notice of Appeal, No. 08-CVS-13456 (N.C. Ct. App. Mar.
5, 2009). Of the ten states with constitutional provisions prohibiting perpetuities, see
sources cited supra note 8, five express similar or identical concern about the political
implications. ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 19 ("contrary to the genius of a republic"); OKLA.
CONST. art. 2, § 32 ("contrary to the genius of a free government"); TENN. CONST. art. 1,
§ 22 ("contrary to the genius of a free State"); TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 26 ("contrary to the
genius of a free government"); Wyo. CONST. art. 1, § 30 ("contrary to the genius of a
free state"). None of the five has, to date, permitted perpetual trusts, although
Tennessee and Wyoming allow very long trusts. See sources cited supra note 6.
Arizona, a state that allows perpetual trusts, ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-2901(A)(3)
(2005 & Supp. 2009), has a constitutional provision with somewhat different wording:
"No hereditary emoluments, privileges, or powers shall be granted or conferred, and
no law shall be enacted permitting any perpetuity or entailment in this State." ARiz.
CONST. art. II, § 29. And in Nevada, which allows trusts lasting 365 years, NEv. REV.
STAT. § 111.1031(1)(b) (2007), the constitution prohibits perpetuities "except for
eleemosynary purposes." NEV. CONST. art. 15, § 4.
57. Benson, No. 08-CVS-13456.

